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Abstract 
 
This master thesis aims to investigate why subsequent repair issues are performed. 
Using data from the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2009, we will take a look 
at whether the following factors are possible explanations for choosing this type 
of floatation method: 1) The announcement effect 2) The discount of the private 
placement and 3) The size of the private placement as a percentage of the 
company’s market value. Through an event study we found the announcement 
effect of both the pure private placements, 0.70%, and the private placements with 
subsequent repair issues, 2.96%. By including the subsequent repair issues we 
find a larger effect, indicating a possible financial reason for adding a repair 
offering. However, only the announcement effect of the pure private placement 
was found to be significant. Secondly, we find considerable differences between 
the average discount of a pure private placement, 5.81%, and a private placement 
with a repair issue, 17.92%. This suggests that subsequent repair offerings are 
chosen when discounts are high, putting weight on equal treatment of the 
excluded shareholders. Additionally, we established that the average size of a pure 
private placement, 19.16 %, is substantially lower than that of a private placement 
with a repair issue, 61.36 %. This also supports equal treatment of the 
shareholders, seeing as larger private placements result in larger dilution of the 
shares.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore why it has become relatively more 
common for companies in the Norwegian stock market to perform a 
“reparasjonsemisjon” at the same time or shortly after a completed private 
placement. Although there is no formal English translation of the word 
“reparasjonsemisjon,” we will use the terms “subsequent repair offering” and 
“repair issue” throughout this thesis. Our aim is to determine whether the 
following factors are possible explanations for choosing this type of floatation 
method: 1) The announcement effect 2) The discount of the private placement and 
3) The size of the private placement as a percentage of the company’s market 
value. As far as we know, there exists no previous research on subsequent repair 
offerings, which makes this topic especially interesting.  
 
Subsequent repair offerings have become a rather common phenomenon in 
Norway over the last years. A subsequent repair offering is a particular method of 
issuing equity and can be defined as a planned seasoned equity offering following 
a private placement. To fully understand the definition we need to take a look at 
what a private placement and a seasoned equity offering is. Basically it is two 
different ways of issuing equity. When we have an equity issuance, we have a sale 
of new stock or equity by a firm to investors. In a private placement we have a 
direct transaction between the firm and one or a small group of investors. 
However, in a seasoned equity offering the equity is issued publicly and takes 
place in an organized market where any registered investor can invest.   
 
Over the last decades there has been produced a considerable amount of research 
papers presenting possible explanations of the choice of different flotation 
methods. The differing market reactions of announcing either a private placement 
or a rights issue is especially well documented and has received a great deal of 
attention. On the announcement of stock offerings, there is a statistically 
significant fall in the value of common stock (Masulis and Korwar 1986). A 
private placement on the other hand tends to give a positive announcement effect. 
While Wruck (1989) gives the resulting change in ownership concentration as an 
explanation, Hertzel and Smith (1993) provide an information-signaling 
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explanation. In our thesis however, we aim to determine the announcement effect 
of a private placement with a subsequent repair offering and compare it to the 
announcement effect of a private placement without a subsequent repair offering 
(pure private placement). Our findings show a greater abnormal return at the 
announcement of private placements with subsequent offerings than for the pure 
private placements. The abnormal return of the private placements with the 
subsequent repair issues is however found to be insignificant, which may indicate 
that the announcement effect is not an explanation for choosing this flotation 
method. It is worth mentioning though that this lack of significance may be due to 
the fact that our first sample only includes 45 private placements with repair 
offerings.    
 
Interviews with five Norwegian investment bankers have provided us with 
important background information for our thesis. According to our sources, 
conducting a private placement actually deviates from the Public Companies Act 
(“Allmennaksjeloven”) and the Securities Trading Act (“Verdipapirhandelloven”). 
The main laws here are “equal treatment of all shareholders” and that existing 
shareholders shall have preference when issuing new shares. In cases where 
companies listed on Oslo Stock Exchange have a defined capital need and a 
pressing time limit, it is not possible in practice to perform an offering that 
includes all shareholders. Therefore companies usually carry out a private 
placement, specifically approved at a shareholders meeting, inviting only the 
largest shareholders and/or new professional institutional investors. Even though 
the stock exchange in several ways requires a subsequent repair offering there are 
several examples of issues where this has not been done. A company would have 
to consider the costs and benefits of performing a repair offering against the 
principle of treating all shareholders equally. The downside of performing a repair 
offering is that it is time-consuming and costly for the company. Additionally, the 
capital need is already mostly covered with the preceding private placement.   
 
The majority of the investment bankers we interviewed agree that the main reason 
as to why companies perform subsequent repair offerings is to make sure that all 
the shareholders are treated as equal as possible. The shareholders that hold a 
relatively small fraction of the company’s shares usually do not get the 
opportunity to participate in private placements. Thus, in order to ensure “fair” 
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treatment, the board of directors can chose to perform a subsequent repair issue. 
This entails giving the shareholders who did not participate in the private 
placement an opportunity to subscribe for shares at the same price. In other words, 
a subsequent offering enables companies to repair the smaller shareholder’s 
fraction in the company and prevent dilution.  
 
Based on this equality issue, we believe that both the size of the discount and the 
size of the private placements have something to do with whether or not a 
company performs a subsequent repair issue. The larger the share discount, the 
more “unfair” it is for the shareholders not included in the private placement and 
the larger the private placement, the larger the dilution of the existing 
shareholder’s shares. We find support for this in our results. When the price 
discount given in the completed private placement is above 10% and up to 20% it 
seems more likely that a company performs a repair offering subsequent the 
private placement. Additionally, as the size of the contemplated private placement 
increases so does the likelihood that a company chooses to perform a subsequent 
repair issue.  
 
The paper proceeds with the following sections. Section 2 presents previous 
research theories we find relevant for our thesis. In section 3 we present our 
hypotheses. Furthermore, section 4 explains the methodology we will use to 
answer our hypotheses. Section 5 contains a brief explanation of the dataset we 
are working with, while section 6 presents our findings and analysis. Finally, 
section 7 summarizes our findings.  
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2 Literature review and previous studies 
  
Because a subsequent repair issue is such a new phenomenon, we have not been 
able to uncover any literature on the topic. Instead, seeing as the repair issue is a 
combination of a private placement and a seasoned equity offering, we have 
looked at the existing literature on these two topics. After presenting previous 
literature on both seasoned equity offerings and private placements, we will 
shortly summarize what we find most relevant for our thesis.  
 
2.1 Seasoned Equity Offerings 
As previously mentioned, a seasoned equity offering is when an already publicly-
traded company issues new equity. Below we review important research in this 
field emphasizing how information asymmetry might have an impact on the 
choice of flotation method and, hence, the announcement effect. We will start by 
exploring an underinvestment problem, which is a basis for much of the later 
research.  
 
Mayers and Majluf (1984) show that when we have information asymmetry, 
better informed managers issue common stock only when they believe their stock 
is overvalued. Thus the market reacts negatively to a stock issue announcement. 
To avoid a wealth transfer from old to new stockholders, they show that the 
managers of undervalued firms with little financial slack will choose to forgo a 
profitable investment opportunity in order to avoid issuing common stock. Due to 
this managers actually underinvest. We call this the underinvestment problem. 
 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) are one of the first to document a statistically 
significant fall in the value of common stock on the announcement of stock 
offerings. Furthermore, they prove that larger pre-announcement stock price run-
ups are associated with larger stock price drops on the offering announcement.  
 
The research of Eckbo and Masulis (1995) is supportive of Masulis and Korwar’s 
findings. They find that the market reaction to equity issues is the most negative 
for firm commitment offers and that standby right issues result in a significantly 
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negative two-day announcement effect. Rights issues on the other hand have only 
an insignificant announcement effect.  
 
Flotation method choices of seasoned equity stock differ substantially across 
countries. While 99% of all issues by U.S. companies in 1980 chose the firm 
commitment method (Eckbo and Masulis 1995), equity issuers in smaller capital 
markets continue to use rights offers (Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen 1997).    
 
According to Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen (1997), rights with standby 
underwriting (standby offers) have become the dominant flotation method on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). The firm commitment method, on the other hand, is 
not observed for public offerings on the OSE. They provide evidence on expected 
shareholder subscription as a determinant of the flotation method, a central 
variable in the asymmetric information framework of Eckbo and Masulis (1992). 
They find that the probability that the issuer selects to underwrite a rights offer 
increases significantly as expected shareholder take-up decreases. Moreover, they 
find little evidence of managerial reluctance to issue rights with a deep discount, 
and do not detect any significant evidence that a deep discount signals negative 
information about equity value, as opposed to Heinkel and Schwartz (1986). 
 
Furthermore, Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen (1997) find, contrary to the U.S. 
evidence, that the two-day announcement effect of rights offers is significantly 
positive and greater for uninsured rights than for standbys. The effect is more 
negative the greater the issue size. They also find the effect more negative the 
greater the pre-announcement run-up in the issuers’ stock price, and more positive 
the greater the proportion of the voting stock held by board members and the CEO 
prior to the issue. These results are consistent with other research in smaller 
capital markets and support the hypothesis that issue markets reflect information 
asymmetries, which again possibly influence the choice of flotation method.  
 
2.2 Private Placements 
We will now take a look at the most important findings from some of the research 
done on private placements. The two first articles we will go through both show 
positive announcement effects when a private placement is announced, but they 
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provide different explanations as to what gives this positive effect; ownership 
concentration and information-signaling. 
 
Wruck (1989) found that the positive announcement effect of a private placement 
is highly correlated with the resulting change in ownership concentration. 
Assuming no other changes in share ownership, a private sale puts a block in 
place and dilutes the voting power of existing blocks. On the other hand, a public 
sale simply dilutes the voting power of existing shareholder blocks.  
 
Over half of the private placement purchasers are not previously affiliated with 
the firm they purchase shares in, meaning they have not been managers or 
previous shareholders in the firm. Thus, when a well-informed non-management 
investor buys a security block this is expected to give the market a positive signal, 
whereas a public offering is expected to give a negative signal. 
 
Increased ownership concentration increases firm value if it helps align the 
incentives of the owners and the shareholders. Although, it can also decrease firm 
value if the private sale allows entrenchment. Wruck’s results show that for low 
levels (0% to 5%) and high levels (≥ 25%) of ownership concentration, after the 
sale, the changes in firm value at announcement are positively associated with the 
change in ownership concentration. However, in the middle range (5% to 25%) 
this relationship is negative.  
 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) on the other hand provide an information-signaling 
explanation of the value gains associated with private placement announcements. 
Their model extends the model of Myers and Majluf (1984) and allows for the 
possibility that, at some cost, private placement investors can correctly estimate 
the firm’s true value through their negotiations with the management. Thus the 
investor’s willingness to commit funds to the firm, in addition to the 
management’s decision to forgo a public issue, will convey a signal to the market 
that the firm in fact is undervalued.  
 
Having looked at both the previous research on SEOs and Private Placements and 
seeing their traditionally opposite announcement effects, we will now take a look 
at an article which looks at characteristics of the issuing firms.  
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Lee and Kocher (2001) compare the firm characteristics of firms issuing common 
stock through private placements and those using public offering methods. Their 
results show that the private placements are smaller in size, have more growth 
opportunities and thus have a greater degree information asymmetry than public 
offering firms. Additionally, private placement firms have less financial slack than 
public offering firms, giving them a greater need for external capital. Due to all 
this, the firms issuing stocks through private placement are more likely to be 
driven by their needs for external capital, rather than being motivated by an 
overvaluation in their stocks. These findings are consistent with the information 
hypothesis. 
 
A final article which is important to highlight is an article by Cronqvist and 
Nilsson from 2003. They have done research on what determines the choice 
between a rights offering and a private placement. They conclude that when all 
else is equal, a family controlled firm is up to two times more likely to avoid an 
SEO method that lowers the value of the family’s control benefits, such as a 
private placement to a new investor. Control considerations have an even larger 
effect when the family’s control margin is small and the wedge between votes and 
capital is large. Secondly, in new product relationships firms use equity ownership 
through a private placement to align interests between business partners, and to 
reduce contracting and ex post holdup problems. Finally, firms choose uninsured 
rights offerings at low levels of asymmetric information about the company’s 
values, but tend to involve underwriter certification at intermediate levels. At high 
to extreme levels firms choose private placements, in particular to current 
investors who are more likely to be informed about the true firm value.  
2.3 Summary 
From this previous research we conclude that it is most common for rights issues 
to give a negative announcement effect while private placements have a positive 
announcement effect. There is also found several possible explanations as to why 
this occurs. This leads us to question what the announcement effect will be for a 
private placement with a subsequent repair issue, seeing as it is a combination of 
the two flotation methods with opposite announcement effects. Since the aim of 
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our thesis is to find out why companies perform subsequent repair issues, this 
announcement effect may provide us with a financial reason for this choice.  
 
 
3 Hypothesis 
 
In addition to the existing literature presented in the previous section, the 
interviews with the five investment bankers have provided us with important 
knowledge. This has greatly contributed to shape our thesis. They pointed out that 
a main reason for performing a repair issue subsequent the private placement is 
treating all shareholders as equal as possible. We learned that in this context there 
are two main factors that are of importance; the price discount of the private 
placement, and the size of the private placement relative to the company’s total 
market value. These factors might affect whether a company chooses to carry out 
a subsequent repair offering. This information has highly influenced our 
hypotheses.      
 
Our main research question is: “Why do companies chose to undertake a 
subsequent repair issue”? To try and find out the reasons behind this, we have 
several hypotheses we would like to test. 
   
3.1 Announcement effect 
The first hypothesis we would like to test is whether the abnormal returns of both 
the pure private placements and the private placements with subsequent repair 
issues are significantly different from zero.  
 
H0: AR = 0 
H1: AR ≠ 0 
 
Based on previous research, we expect the pure private placements to have a 
positive announcement effect. As the announcement effect of private placements 
with subsequent repair issues has not previously been looked at it is a little more 
difficult to know what to expect here. However, as it consists of a private 
placement which most likely gives a positive announcement effect and a seasoned 
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equity offering which most likely gives a negative effect, maybe the two effects 
will cancel each other out? On the other hand, a repair issue lets the shareholders 
take part in something they otherwise would not be able to and at the same price 
as the private placement investors. Thus, we believe that the effect might still be 
positive and maybe even more positive than that of the pure private placement. If 
the announcement effect of the repair issue in fact is greater, this may provide us 
with a possible financial reason for choosing to execute a repair issue after a 
private placement.  
 
3.2 Significantly different announcement effects? 
The second hypothesis we will be testing is whether the two outcomes/means 
from our first hypothesis are significantly different from each other. Is the 
announcement effect of a pure private placement significantly different from that 
of a private placement with a subsequent repair issue? 
 
H0: ARpure pp = ARpp with repair issue 
H1: ARpure pp ≠ ARpp with repair issue 
 
If the announcement effect of the private placement with the subsequent repair 
issue is significantly larger than the pure private placement’s effect, then this may 
indicate a reason for choosing to perform a repair issue.  
 
3.3 Discount 
Thirdly, our aim is to explore the connection between the price discount given to 
the participants in the private placement and whether a company performs a 
subsequent repair offering or not. To do this we will be looking at the discount of 
a pure private placement compared to the discount of a private placement with a 
subsequent repair offering. According to the companies and the investment 
bankers we have talked to, the fairness in offering the same subscription price to 
all the company’s shareholders seems to be a main reason for choosing a repair 
issue after a private placement. Thus, the larger the discount, the more unfair it 
will be for shareholders unable to participate in the private placement. Based on 
this background information we expect the discount of private placements with 
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subsequent repair issues to be larger than the discounts of pure private placements. 
If this is true, then we might be able to confirm that the size of the private 
placement discount is a factor which affects the decision of including a 
subsequent repair issue.  
 
3.4 Size 
3.4.1 Size of subsequent repair issue relative to private placement  
Another feature we would like to look in to is the actual size of the subsequent 
repair issue compared to its corresponding private placement. We intend to 
determine the size of the repair issue relative to the private placement and 
examine whether there is a general tendency of determining the size of repair 
offerings. Is there a common market practice of setting the size of the repair issue 
relative to the private placement? Based on our background information from the 
investment bankers, it is most common for the repair issue to be smaller than the 
private placement.  
 
3.4.2 Issue size relative to market capital 
In addition we will try to measure the size of the pure private placements and the 
private placements with subsequent repair offerings as a percentage of the 
company’s total market value. The reason for doing this is that we believe that the 
size of the initial private placement may be a factor affecting whether or not the 
companies conduct a repair issue. The larger the private placement is, the more 
diluted the shares of the excluded shareholders will be. Thus to be fair towards the 
shareholders, we believe that the repair issues are conducted when the private 
placements are large.  
 
 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Announcement effect 
To examine the market reactions of announcing private placements, both with and 
without subsequent repair offerings, we will perform an event study. An event 
study is a statistical method which measures the impact of a certain event on stock 
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prices, in our case the event is a private placement both with and without a 
subsequent offering. The reason we choose to compare the effects of the two 
different private placements instead of the repair issues versus the rights issues, is 
that the private placements have more similar characteristics. The size of a repair 
issue is usually much smaller than that of a regular rights issue, due to the fact that 
in a repair issue capital is already collected in a previous private placement.  
 
We estimate the abnormal stock returns by using δ as the conditional parameter in 
the following model, as done by Eckbo and Norli in 2004: 
 



2
1j
itjtijmtii drrit   
 
where: 
rit= continuously compounded daily equity return for firm i over period t 
αi= a constant 
βi= systematic risk to firm i 
rmt= daily return on a value weighted market portfolio of OSE-listed stocks 
δ ij= the daily abnormal return to firm i averaged over the event window 
d jt= the dummy variable 
it = the error term for firm i over period t 
 
In the event study we have constructed two different dummy variables, 
representing separate event windows. Dummy 1 is the “announcement dummy” 
from day -2 to 1, where day zero represents the announcement day of the private 
placement/subsequent repair issue. Theoretically, the entire market reaction to an 
announcement should register exactly on the announcement date. However, there 
are several reasons for choosing a four-day-window as we have done instead of 
choosing only one. One reason for including a couple days before the 
announcement date is because leakage can occur. Another reason is that the 
market probably knows about the company’s need for capital well in advance of 
the announcement day and may therefore be able to expect an offering or a private 
placement. By including a day after the announcement date we account for the 
possibility of an announcement after stock close on day 0. If this is the case, then 
the full effect of the announcement will not be captured until the following day.  
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Our second dummy, dummy 2, is the “run-up dummy”, which is from day -10 to -
2. Each of our two dummies takes on the value of 1 inside the event window and 
zero otherwise.  
 
Our estimation period starts at trading day -251 relative to the announcement date 
and ends at trading day +20, a total of 272 trading days. To ensure high precession 
in our estimates and as little noise as possible, we have decided to exclude all 
issues with less than 126 trading days (6 months) of data prior to the 
announcement. 
  
The average abnormal return (AR) is calculated by the following formula: 



n
i
i
n
AR
1
1
  
To find the average abnormal return over the two different event windows, we 
have to multiply it by the number of days in the event window. This gives the 4-
day abnormal return for dummy 1 and the 9-day abnormal return for dummy 2.  
 
To decide whether or not we can reject the nil hypothesis that abnormal returns 
are non-existing, we must perform a test to see whether the abnormal returns we 
find are significant or not. For this we will use a z-test. Under the nil hypothesis of 
zero abnormal returns, the following test statistic converges in distribution to the 
standard normal (Eckbo and Norli 2004): 
 



N
i ij
ij
j
N
z
1 ˆ
ˆ1


 
 
where: 
ijˆ  = the OLS estimate of δ ij  
ijˆ  = the standard error of ijˆ   
 N = sample size 
 
According to the rule of thumb, statistical significance is inferred when the z-
statistic is located around and above 2. In addition, we will find the corresponding 
two-tailed p-values, using a table of the standard normal cumulative distribution 
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function, Ф(z). If the p-value is smaller than the chosen significance level, the 
result we have found is significant and we will reject the nil hypothesis.  
 
4.2 Significantly different announcement effects? 
Seeing as the announcement date of the private placement and the repair offering 
is congruent, we will contemplate the event study above for both the pure private 
placements and the private placements followed by a repair offering. In addition 
we will test to find out whether the two results we find are significantly different 
from one another.  
 
To test this, we apply a linear cross-sectional model: 
 
 
 
Here, AR is the 4-day abnormal announcement return and i represents a set of 
explanatory variables. A regression analysis measures the observations at the 
same point in time or over the same time period, however they differ along other 
dimensions. We will include the following explanatory variables:  
 
dummysizediscountoi 321    
 
where: 
discount = the price discounts of the private placements 
size = the size of each private placement as a % of total market capital 
dummy = 1 when we have a private placement with a repair issue and  
     0 when we have a pure private placement 
 
The effect we are looking for, to decide whether there is a significant difference 
between the average abnormal return of the pure private placements and the 
private placements with repair issues, lies in the dummy. o  gives us the average 
abnormal return, when checked for the effect of the three explanatory variables. 
3  on the other hand tells us the additional effect on the abnormal returns when 
Ni ,......,1
iiAR  
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including a subsequent repair issue. Thus, if we find that 3  is significant we can 
confirm that there is in fact a difference between the announcement effect of a 
pure private placement and the announcement effect of a private placement with a 
subsequent repair issue.  
 
4.3 Power 
In order to make sure that our results are not unduly affected by outliers in our 
samples, we will do some robustness testing. This would especially be of 
importance due to the size of our sample containing the private placements with 
subsequent repair offerings. Trimmed and winsorized means are robust estimators 
of the population mean that are relatively insensitive to the outlying values in the 
data set. These will be the estimators we intend to use in this matter.  
 
When trimming data, you actually remove the most extreme data in both ends of 
the distribution by eliminating the k highest and the k lowest observations in the 
dataset. This method gives a new trimmed mean tky : 
  




kn
ki
itk y
kn
y
1
)(2
1
 
 
Winsorizing is a slightly different method, which involves replacing a certain 
percentage of the sample at the high and low end of the distribution with the most 
extreme remaining values. Meaning that the k smallest observations are replaced 
by the (k+1) smallest observation and the k largest are replaced by the (k+1) 
largest. Also here we get a new winsorized mean wky :  
 






 


  )(
1
2
)()1( )1()1(
1
kn
kn
ki
ikwk ykyyk
n
y  
 
For a symmetric distribution a symmetrically trimmed or winsorized mean is an 
unbiased estimate of the population mean. However, the trimmed or winsorized 
means are not normal distributed, thus we need the winsorized sum of squared 
deviations. 
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 This is defined as: 
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By utilizing the winsorized sum of squares we can now perform a trimmed t-test: 
 
where: 
 
 
The winsorized t-test is pretty similar:  
 
where: 
 
These t-values are then to be compared to their critical values to see whether the 
results are significant or not.  
 
4.4 Discount  
To calculate the discounts of the pure private placements and the private 
placements with subsequent repair issues, we have extracted both sample’s 
subscription prices and each stock’s market prices at date 0 (the announcement 
date). By comparing the subscription price of the private placement to the price 
that is offered in the market (Oslo Stock Exchange) at the announcement date, we 
are able to determine the price discount.  
 
4.5 Size  
4.5.1 Size of subsequent repair issue relative to private placement  
To answer our hypothesis regarding the size of the repair issue, we have 
calculated the size of the repair issue as a percentage of its corresponding private 
placement.  
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4.5.2 Issue size relative to market capital  
Finally, we need to find the percentage size of the pure private placements and the 
private placements with subsequent repair offerings, compared to the company’s 
total market value. This was found by using the market value of the company 5 
trading days (one week) before the announcement date and comparing this to the 
value of the private placement. The value of the private placement was calculated 
by multiplying the number of shares issued with the issue price in the private 
placement. 
 
 
5 Data 
5.1 Specification  
The dataset in this thesis was mainly provided by our supervisor Øyvind Norli. It 
contains private placements and rights issues performed by companies listed on 
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the time period from February 1997 to 
December 2009. In this dataset we have considered the fact that if only long-term 
survivors were included, our samples could be affected by survivorship bias. 
Thus, in order to handle this potential bias and to get the most realistic picture of 
the companies’ performance, companies that are no longer traded at OSE are 
included in the sample as well.    
 
To supplement the data we received we have manually collected; announcement 
dates, the number of shares issued in both the private placements and the rights 
offerings, and the subscription prices. This data has been collected through OSE’s 
database, www.NewsWeb.no, and the digital archive of articles, Atekst. During 
this process we classified the private placements according to whether or not they 
were connected to a subsequent repair offering. A private placement was 
connected to a subsequent repair offering when the subscription price and the 
announcement date were equal. We removed the rights offerings which where not 
subsequent repair offerings from the dataset, as well as the subsequent repair 
offerings where we could not identify the congruent private placement. The 
reason these private placements were not contained in our dataset could be that 
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they did not satisfy the demands of a certain size and were therefore excluded. 
After sorting out the irrelevant data from our dataset we sorted the remaining data 
into two different samples; sample 1 containing the pure private placements and 
sample 2 including the private placements with subsequent repair offerings.  
 
5.2 Sample characteristics  
The two samples consist of 471 pure private placements (sample 1) and 47 private 
placements with subsequent repair offerings (sample 2). Total number of 
observations are 124 149 and 12 590 respectively. There has been an increase in 
both sample 1 and sample 2 over the last half of the sample period. However, 
there was a drop of the number of pure private placements in 2008 and 2009, 
whereas there are more private placements with subsequent repair offerings in 
2009 than any other year. Figure 5.2.1 below illustrates the private placements 
both with and without subsequent repair issues, as a percentage of the total 
number of private placements yearly from 1997-2009.  
 
Figure 5.2.1 Sample characteristics 
 
 
Figure 5.2.1 shows that private placements with subsequent repair offerings 
amount to less than 20% of the total number of private placements, except in 
2009. However, seeing as there are very few cases of firms performing subsequent 
repair offerings before 1997, we thus find that this flotation method still has 
become relatively common over the sample period.     
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5.3 Interviews 
In addition to the quantitative data, we wanted a more qualitative perspective 
including a thorough insight into why a relatively large number of Norwegian 
companies undertake subsequent repair offerings. Thus, we have as mentioned 
interviewed several of the Norwegian investment bankers that organize these 
types of offerings, as well as some of the companies that recently have performed 
a private placement with a subsequent repair offering. The outcome was very 
useful information about how subsequent repair offerings work in practice in the 
Norwegian stock market. The information we obtained has been used as 
background information throughout our thesis.   
 
    
6 Results and discussion 
6.1 Announcement effect 
From the event study we receive a positive announcement effect for the pure 
private placements of 0.70%, as seen in table 6.1.1 below. We obtain a z-value of 
2.68, which infers statistical significance. Further we find that the pure private 
placement has a positive run-up value of 2.96%, with a z-value of 4.85. Statistical 
significance is confirmed for both effects by the p-values of 0.0074 and 0.0002 
respectively. Seeing as both p-values are less than 0.01, we find a significant 
announcement and run-up effect at a 1% level. The positive and significant 
abnormal return is in line with what most researchers have found in previous 
research. 
 
Table 6.1.1 Announcement and run-up effects of Pure Private Placements 
Pure Private Placement Dummy 1 Dummy 2 
Mean 0.007012 0.029634 
Standard Deviation 0.118501 0.140622 
Observations 471 471 
Z-value 2.6786 4.8505 
P-value 0.0074 0.0002 
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When looking at the same results for the private placements with subsequent 
repair issues in table 6.1.2, we receive a considerably larger positive 
announcement effect of 2.27%. Seeing as the average market reaction is this big 
on average we would believe it to be significant, however the z-value tells a 
different story. The z-value of 1.18 is not even close to 2, and since the p-value of 
0.238 is higher than the 5% significance level, the result is insignificant. The run-
up effect of the private placements with repair issues of 1.60% is also insignificant 
and smaller than the effect of the pure private placements.  
 
Table 6.1.2 Announcement and run-up effects of Private Placements with repair 
issues 
Private Placement with rep Dummy 1 Dummy 2 
Mean 0.022652 0.015999 
Standard Deviation 0.190371 0.281384 
Observations 45 45 
Z-value 1.1775 0.4583 
P-value 0.2380 0.6456 
 
The insignificant announcement effect of the private placements with subsequent 
repair issues may be due to for example extreme outliers or incorrect 
announcement dates. However, we have thoroughly checked each single one of 
the announcement dates we received and changed the one’s we found to be 
wrong. Thus we have confidence in the fact that the announcement dates are not 
to blame for the insignificance. A possible reason for the insignificance found is 
rather that this sample consists of a relatively small dataset of only 45. Seeing as 
we are confident in our announcement dates and we are not able to increase the 
dataset, we will now try to correct for possible outliers by using 2 statistical 
methods called trimming and winsorizing. We will use these methods as a 
robustness test on both samples.   
 
When using trimming as a robustness test, we trim the data in both ends by 
eliminating 5 %, 7 % and 10 % of the highest and the lowest observations in the 
dataset. This gives us new trimmed means and trimmed t-values as shown in table 
6.1.3 below. However, we can see that the t-values actually decrease the larger the 
trimming. This is true for both samples. For the pure private placements we have 
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gone from having a significant z-value to having insignificant trimmed t-values. This 
indicates that the significance we found earlier may not be robust. Additionally the t-
values of the private placements with repair issues remain insignificant, thus we do 
not gain any significance by trimming the values.  
 
Table 6.1.3 Trimmed means and t-values 
 Trimmed 5% Trimmed 7% Trimmed 10% 
Pure private placement    
Mean 0.003346 0.002123 0.001487 
Standard deviation 0.004036 0.005331 0.004519 
Observations 425 407 377 
T-value 0.8290 0.3981 0.3291 
Private Placement with rep    
Mean 0.012102 0.009138 0.005202 
Standard deviation 0.025742 0.024976 0.024932 
Observations 41 39 35 
T-value 0.4701 0.3659 0.2087 
 
The next robustness test we tried was winsorizing. Instead of removing 5%, 7% 
and 10% of the dataset and reducing the sample size, we just replaced these 
percentages with the most extreme of the remaining values. The new winsorized 
results are presented in table 6.1.4 below.  
 
Table 6.1.4 Winsorized means and t-values 
 Winsorized 5% Winsorized 7% Winsorized 10% 
Pure private placement    
Mean 0.006318 0.003473 0.002206 
Standard deviation 0.004037 0.005106 0.004189 
Observations 471 471 471 
T-value 1.5652 0.6803 0.5504 
Private Placement with rep    
Mean 0.017239 0.013761 0.007879 
Standard deviation 0.025771 0.023769 0.021261 
Observations 45 45 45 
T-value 0.6689 0.5789 0.3706 
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As we can see from the table we still do not receive significant t-values after 
winsorizing. Also here the pure private placements no longer have the significant 
results as before, indicating a lack of robustness in the results.  Both trimming and 
winsorizing gives automatically reduced standard deviations, however the means 
are also reduced by these methods since the most extreme positive values also are 
removed. For both these samples and methods the effect of the reduced standard 
deviation is smaller than the effect of the reduced mean.  
 
Removing or replacing the most extreme outliers did not work in order to find a 
significant announcement effect for either of the samples. Thus we conclude that 
our earlier significant results for the pure private placements are not very robust. 
However, although no significance is found for the private placements with repair 
issues, we believe that the insignificance in this sample may be due to the 
relatively low sample size of only 45. Several investment bankers stated that 
announcing a subsequent repair issue at the same time as a private placement is 
received positively in the market. Our expectations of a positive announcement 
effect for private placements with subsequent repair offerings were mainly driven 
by this information. We still have reason to believe that the announcement effect 
most likely is positive, and that the results might have been significant with a 
larger sample available.   
 
6.2 Significantly different announcement effects? 
From above, we found that the announcement effect of the private placements 
with subsequent repair offerings is rendered insignificant. However, we have a 
clear indication that the announcement of a private placement with a subsequent 
repair issue gives a greater positive effect than announcing a pure private 
placement. The fact that there is a difference between the average means of the 
two samples of as much as 1.56 % supports this.  
 
To test if the difference between the two abnormal announcement effects is 
significant, we will as mentioned use a cross sectional regression. The results 
from the regression are presented in table 6.2.1 below.  
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Table 6.2.1 Results from the cross sectional regression 
 Φ0 Discount Size Dummy 
Coefficient 0.001165 -0.003550 0.000766 0.005275 
Standard error 0.001449 0.002263 0.002028 0.004844 
T-statistic 0.8039 -1.5690 0.3777 1.0890 
P-value 0.4219 0.1173 0.7058 0.2767 
 
As the table shows, discount has a negative effect on the abnormal return while 
size has a positive effect. Both these effects are however insignificant seeing as 
their p-values are larger than 0.05. More importantly we also find a positive effect 
of 0.5% from the dummy, when we include a subsequent repair offering. This 
gives a new abnormal return of 0.12% + 0.5% = 0.17% for these issues. However, 
compared to the abnormal return of 0.12% for the pure private placements there is 
no significant difference between the results. This can be supported by looking at 
the dummy’s p-value of 0.28 which is larger than 0.05 and therefore insignificant 
at a 5% level. Thus, we will keep the nil hypothesis: ARpure pp = ARpp with repair issue.  
 
However, we can keep in mind that the result we found here also may have been 
affected by the insignificance we have found for the announcement effect of the 
private placements with subsequent repair issues.  
 
6.3 Discount 
When analyzing the price discounts in sample 1 and sample 2, we find great 
differences between the discount given to participants in a pure private placement 
and in a private placement with a repair offering. When using the entire datasets, 
we find a mean price discount of 0.53% for the pure private placements, and a 
mean of 17.87% for the private placements with repair issues.  
 
However, when examining the two datasets more closely we observe indicators 
that some of our data might be biased. Some of the private placements, both with 
and without repair issues, give substantial negative price discounts. Considering 
that it is not very likely that shareholders will subscribe for shares at the private 
placement’s subscription price when the market price actually is considerably 
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lower, a negative discount is not logical. Due to the large negative discounts, these 
data are obviously not representative. Thus we extract two new average discounts 
in table 6.3.1, excluding the negative price discounts entirely. We obtain an 
average discount of 9.60% for the pure private placements and a 23.44% average 
for the private placements with repair issues. This is a great increase from the 
averages we got when including the entire dataset.  
 
Table 6.3.1 Discount sizes with no negative discounts 
  Pure PP  PP with repair issue 
Mean 9.60 % 23.44 % 
Max 89.67 % 80.04 % 
Min 0.00 % 0.00 % 
Median 3.62 % 18.82 % 
Variance 0.02831 0.04291 
Observations 360 40 
 
As we can see, this maneuver has had a larger effect on the mean of our first 
sample. This can be explained by the fact that sample 1 contained considerably 
more observations than sample 2, including more biased data. It was thus 
necessary to subtract more data from sample 1, which subsequently results in a 
greater difference in the mean discount compared to the original samples.  
 
However, some smaller negative discounts are in fact possible. One reason for this 
is that sometimes the subscription prices are set as an average market price of a 
certain period before the announcement. In order to obtain more representative 
results we have removed not all the negative discounts as above, but only the most 
biased. When removing the most biased data, we have not only removed the most 
extreme negative outliers, but also the most extreme positive outliers.  By 
extracting these outliers in our samples, we get a new mean discount of 5.81% for 
the pure private placement, whereas we find the mean discount for the private 
placement with a repair offering to be 17.92%, see table 6.3.2 below.  
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Table 6.3.2 Discount sizes without extreme outliers 
 Pure PP PP with repair issue 
Mean 5.81 % 17.92 % 
Max 89.67 % 71.43 % 
Min -55.65 % -16.36 % 
Median 2.872 % 14.62 % 
Variance 0.03208 0.03115 
Observations 444 43 
 
The means in table 6.3.2 are again reduced from the means we found by including 
all the data and by excluding all the negative data. We feel that these means are 
the most representative, seeing as smaller negative discounts are in fact possible. 
Although the means are reduced, the results above still reveal a significantly 
higher price discount in private placements with subsequent repair offerings than 
in the pure private placements. This confirms our expectations as well as the 
common comprehension of the importance of discounts in private placements, and 
proves a quite interesting feature of the subsequent repair offerings. The higher 
the discount given in a completed private placement, the more likely it is that a 
company chooses to perform a subsequent repair offering. More precisely, when 
the private placement discount is above 10% and up to 20%, there seems to be a 
higher chance of a company performing a subsequent repair offering than if the 
discount is below 10%. Furthermore, these results are congruent with the 
information we got from our sources. Some of the investment bankers stated that 
there is some sort of a threshold level of about 10% for whether a subsequent 
repair offering is worth performing. We conclude that the size of the price 
discount may be a factor which affects the decision of whether or not to perform a 
subsequent repair issue. Alternatively, if the issuer knows that there will be a 
repair issue subsequent to the private placement, it will be less problematic to give 
the investors a deep discount in the private placement.  
 
As mentioned above, we find a higher average discount for private placements 
with subsequent repair offerings than pure private placements. Figure 6.3.3 below 
shows the evolvement of average discounts per year for both samples.  
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Figure 6.3.3 Average discounts over the years 
 
The graph illustrates substantial increases in price discounts for private 
placements with repair issues in the time periods 2000 – 2002 and 2008 – 2009. 
Possible reasons may be that during the burst of the IT bubble and the financial 
crisis companies had a hard time raising money and thus offered higher discounts 
to investors in private placements. Hence, there is a possibility that subsequent 
repair offerings were offered to non-participating investors to make up for the 
high discounts. Our background information also confirms that during the 
financial crisis, high discounts were offered to investors in private placements 
because of hard times in the financial markets.  
 
6.4 Size 
6.4.1 Size of subsequent repair issue relative to private placement  
When taking a look at the size of a subsequent repair issue as a percentage of the 
corresponding private placement, we have a great range. It is most common that 
the pure private placement has the largest amount of shares, however the opposite 
does occur. When using the entire dataset, our results show that subsequent repair 
offerings have an average size of 53.26% relative to the private placements. 
However, just as with the discount data, we have some outliers here as well. By 
removing one extreme outlier, the average size is now 37.98%, as shown below in 
table 6.4.1.1. What we do not see in the two averages mentioned above is that 
some of the repair offerings in our data were actually undersubscribed. By still 
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extracting the one extreme outlier and based on the shares that were initially 
offered in the repair offering, we find another mean size of 44.15%. 
 
Table 6.4.1.1 Subsequent repair issue as a % of Private Placement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results above show that the average size of a subsequent offering is generally 
lower than the accompanying private placement. Furthermore, it is worth 
mentioning that we also find some cases of oversubscription, although fewer cases 
than undersubscription. This however does not affect the mean. The mean is not 
affected due to the fact that when a subsequent repair offering is oversubscribed, 
we see that in nearly all the cases the subscribed amount of shares is not issued. 
Instead, the company chooses to issue the predetermined and originally offered 
amount. It is thus not favorable for companies to increase their capital too much 
and beyond what is planned.   
 
From our background conversations with the investment bankers we are made 
aware of the fact that when deciding the size of a repair offering, companies can 
employ two different methods. The first method entails the board offering shares 
in the subsequent repair offering simply as a fixed percentage of the shares offered 
in the private placement. This method was confirmed by one company that we 
interviewed. In this company, the board decided that the shares offered in the 
repair offering ought to be 30% of the total amount of shares in the private 
placement. The other method is to decide the size through more thorough 
calculations. By calculating the fraction of shareholders reached through the 
private placement and their shares in the company, it is possible to determine the 
right amount of shares to be offered to the remaining shareholders to not dilute 
their shares. This is a method which also can lead to the more rare case where the 
repair issue actually is larger than the private placement.   
Subsequent repair issue as a % of Private Placements 
 Subscribed Planned 
Mean 37.98 % 44.15 % 
Max 224.88 % 224.88 % 
Min 0.19 % 4.08 % 
Median 22.40 % 30.28 % 
Variance 0.25664 0.23469 
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Looking at our results in the table 6.4.1.1 above and figure 6.4.1.2 below, the 
large dispersion in the data makes the second method of choosing the size of the 
repair issue seem more likely.  
 
Figure 6.4.1.2 Repair issues as a % of Private Placement 
 
 
The figure above shows the number of subsequent repair issues in each size 
category. As we can see, the subsequent repair issues are mainly from 0% and up 
to 60% of the private placements, with the category 0-10% having the highest 
number of repair issues. We cannot confirm the usage of the second method 
through calculations, seeing as we do not have any information about how many 
shareholders participate in the two issues and how many shares they hold. 
However, we can confirm that from our dataset we have not found a tendency of 
choosing a certain percentage as in the first method.  
 
6.4.2 Issue size relative to market capital  
It is obvious that the larger the private placement, the more diluted are the shares 
of the shareholders that are not invited. Thus, an important reason for performing 
a repair issue is to prevent dilution of all existing shareholders. Having this in 
mind, we aimed to compare the percentage of shares issued in private placements 
with and without repair issues relative to the issuing company’s market capital. 
We found that the pure private placements have an average issue size of 19.47%, 
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whereas the private placements with repair issues have an average issue size of 
61.36%, as shown in table 6.4.2.1 below. 
 
Table 6.4.2.1 Issue size as a % of market capital 
 Pure PP PP with repair issue 
Mean 19.47 % 61.36 % 
Max 1077.54 % 308.21% 
Min 0.03 % 3.99 % 
Median 9.65 % 38.07 % 
Variance 0,38530 0.41908 
 
What we also observe from this table is that although the average of the pure 
private placements is considerably smaller, it contains more extreme values. The 
pure private placements have both a higher maximum size and a lower minimum 
size. This may be due to the differing sample sizes. In figure 6.4.2.2 we take a 
closer look at the distribution of the issue sizes. The figure shows how the private 
placements with and without repair issues are spread over different size 
categories.  
 
Figure 6.4.2.2 Issue size as a % of market capital 
 
 
As we can see, almost 60% of the pure private placements are between 0-10% of 
the company’s total market value. The pure private placements also have the 
largest share in the category 10-20%, but from 20-30% and higher the private 
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placements with subsequent repair issues dominate. An exception is however in 
the category 100%+, but these are extreme outliers and quite rare.  
 
Based on the differing averages from table 6.4.2.1 and the spread in figure 6.4.2.2, 
our expectations of companies performing a subsequent repair issue after issuing a 
large amount of shares in a private placement are clearly confirmed. This means 
that the larger the relative issue size, the higher is the probability that companies 
actually perform a repair issue after the private placement. This conclusion also 
supports our equality theory; subsequent repair issues are conducted as an attempt 
to treat all shareholders equally.  
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
The principle purpose of this master was to examine why companies perform 
subsequent repair offerings after private placements. To investigate this we used 
data on private placements and rights offerings from the Oslo Stock Exchange 
between 1997 and 2009. To take a look at whether there were any financial 
reasons for performing subsequent repair issues, we performed an event study to 
find the announcement effect of private placements with and without the repair 
issues. From the study we found an announcement effect of 0.70% for the pure 
private placements and a considerably larger announcement effect of 2.96% for 
the private placements with repair issues. This difference indicates a possible 
financial reason for performing repair issues. However, while the announcement 
effect of 0.70% is statistically significant, the results for the private placements 
with repair issues were rendered insignificant. When testing the differences 
between the two means we did not obtain significance here either.   
 
Additionally, we used trimming and winsorizing as robustness tests to see whether 
there where outliers greatly affecting the means. Both our results were found to be 
insignificant with our new robust means. Logically speaking, an announcement of 
a subsequent repair issue should only be positively received in the market, seeing 
that it is solely beneficial for all shareholders. We suspect that the insignificance 
in sample 2 may be due to the very low sample size of only 45. 
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In addition to examining the announcement effect of private placements with 
subsequent repair issues, we also looked at other reasons for contemplating such 
an offering. The main reason, which is both claimed by the investment bankers 
and is supported by issuing company’s prospectus, is equality for the 
shareholders. A finding that supports this theory of equality is the considerable 
differences between the average price discount in the pure private placements of 
5.81% versus the price discount of the private placements with repair issues of 
17.92%. This difference suggests that subsequent offerings are performed when 
the private placement discounts are high, putting weight on the equal treatment of 
the excluded shareholders. Thus we can conclude that the size of the discount may 
be a factor when contemplating whether or not to perform a subsequent repair 
issue.  
 
Based on our conversations with investment bankers we learned that there are 
basically two ways of setting the size of a repair issue. The first just sets a certain 
percentage, while the other is more mathematical. The second method is based on 
how many shareholders are included and excluded in the private placement and 
aims to set the size to keep the dispersion of shares to a minimum. Our findings 
show an average repair issue size of 27.98% of the private placement. However, 
the spread between the highest and lowest fractions was very varying. This 
indicates that it might be the second method which is the most used. 
 
We have found the average size of the pure private placements (19.16%) to be 
much smaller than that of the private placements with subsequent repair issues 
(61.36%), when compared to total market value of the firm. This is another 
finding that supports the equality theory and tells us that the size of the private 
placement also is a factor which influences the choice of performing a subsequent 
repair issue. The larger the size, the higher the possibility of contemplating a 
repair issue. This is fair because the larger the private placement, the more diluted 
are the shares of the excluded shareholders.  
 
To sum up, we have tested the influence of three different factors on a company’s 
choice of whether or not to perform a subsequent repair issue. The announcement 
effect’s influence is somewhat unclear seeing as we did not find significant 
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results. However, we have shown that both the price discount in the private 
placement and the size of the private placement affects the decision of 
contemplating a repair issue.  
 
For future research on the topic, we suggest including all the private placements 
with subsequent repair issues and not excluding any on the basis of size. This will 
give a larger dataset and might provide more significant results when testing the 
announcement effect. Additionally, we preferred to compare the private 
placements with and without subsequent repair issues when finding the 
announcement effect. It would be interesting to compare the standard rights issues 
to repair issues instead, this could yield different results.  
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Executive Summary 
 
In our thesis we would like to explore the recent development of a special type of 
subsequent offerings in Norway, called “reparasjonsemisjon”.  
 
We start by looking at what a” reparasjonsemisjon” actually is by defining this 
phenomenon and looking at common characteristics. Then we proceed by looking 
at existing literature. Seeing as this a relatively new phenomenon, with little or no 
research done in the area, we have so far focused on reading existing articles on 
Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) and Private Placements. On the topics of SEOs 
and Private placements, there is a general consensus that they in fact have 
opposite announcement effects. While the announcement of a SEO has a negative 
effect on the stock price performance, an announcement of a private placement 
has a positive effect. However, in the long run both underperform.  
 
Then we continue by formulating our research questions. Based on the existing 
literature, we come up with two interesting questions that we would like examine; 
namely the incentives companies have for conducting a “reparasjonsemisjon,” and 
the announcement effect and long-term performance of these offerings. 
     
We plan to make use of both qualitative and quantitative data. Having the first 
research question in mind, we hope we will get the chance to interview companies 
that actually have issued these relatively new offerings and banks that have 
facilitated them. When it comes to the second research question, we plan to use 
gathered data on “reparasjonsemisjoner” and private placements from Øyvind 
Norli. The data set contains data on Norwegian issues conducted at Oslo Stock 
Exchange.   
 
At the end we hope to get a thorough insight into why the “reparasjonsemisjon” is 
an increasing phenomenon in Norway.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The phenomenon “reparasjonsemisjon” has become relatively common in Norway 
over the last years. Studying the prospectus for companies that have issued shares 
in a “reparasjonsemisjon,” we find that they use the term subsequent offering to 
explain “reparasjonsemisjon” in English. We will be using both terms throughout 
this paper. Thus, we define a “reparasjonsemisjon”/subsequent offering as a 
planned seasoned equity offering following a private placement.  
 
To understand the definition, we need to know what a private placement and a 
seasoned equity offering is, namely two different ways of issuing equity. When 
we have an equity issuance, we have a sale of new stock or equity by a firm to 
investors. It can be done as a private placement, where we have a direct 
transaction between the firm and one or a small group of investors. Or it can be 
done publicly where the firm registers the securities with the authorities and the 
sale take place in an organized market (secondary market) where any registered 
investor can invest. A seasoned equity offering is a common type of public equity 
issuance; it entails that an already publicly-traded company issues new equity. We 
will later take a closer look at what it entails in the context of the subsequent 
offering.  
 
By looking at the prospectus of the companies which have conducted a 
subsequent offering we can see a couple of similarities in the processes. Common 
for all, is that the subsequent offer is only offered to those who hold shares in the 
company at the time of the private placement, and did not participate in the actual 
private placement. Each eligible shareholder then gets subscription rights 
according to the amount of shares they hold at the date of the private placement. 
For example, in Clevis Parma’s subsequent offering (20.07.09) every eligible 
shareholder received 1 subscription right for every 4,282582 share held.  
 
From the different firm’s prospectus we observe that the time between the private 
placement and the subsequent offer varies from company to company. The 
subscription periods of most of the subsequent offerings start about a month after 
the private placement is performed. However, there are some that start just a week 
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after the private placement, while others are up to 3 months after. The lengths of 
the subscription periods are also varying, but two weeks seems to be a common 
length. We also see that the amounts of shares offered in the subsequent offerings 
are of a much lower number than the amount offered in the private placement.  
 
The reason we believe this is a very interesting topic is because it is such a new 
phenomenon, that possibly no one has looked at the reasons behind contemplating 
a “reparasjonsemisjon” and the financial impacts of doing so. In other words, 
since “reparasjonsemisjon” has become a new trend, we are very motivated to get 
an insight into why companies switch from regular equity offerings to these new 
offerings. In addition, seeing that “reparasjonsemisjon” is a typical Norwegian 
phenomenon, it motivates us even more since we are especially interested in the 
Norwegian stock market. 
 
2 Existing literature 
 
Because a ”reparasjonsemisjon” is such a new phenomenon, we have not been 
able to uncover any literature on the topic. Instead, seeing as a 
“reparasjonsemisjon” is a combination of a private placement and a seasoned 
equity offering, we have looked at the existing literature on those two topics. 
 
2.1 Seasoned Equity Offerings 
As mentioned above, a seasoned equity offering is when an already publicly-
traded company issue new equity. Below we review important research in this 
field emphasizing how information asymmetry might have an impact on the 
choice of flotation method and, hence, the announcement effect. Finally, we look 
into the research on post-offering performance.    
 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) document a statistically significant fall in the value of 
common stock on the announcement of stock offerings. Furthermore, they prove 
that larger pre-announcement stock price run-ups are associated with larger stock 
price drops on the offering announcement.  
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The research of Eckbo and Masulis (1995) is supportive of Masulis and Korwar’s 
findings. They find that the market reaction to equity issues is most negative for 
firm commitment offers, standby rights issues results in a significantly negative 
two-day announcement effect, while rights issues have only a an insignificant 
announcement effect.  
 
Flotation method choices of seasoned equity stock differ substantially across 
countries. While 99% of all issues by U.S. companies in 1980 chose the firm 
commitment method (Eckbo and Masulis 1995), equity issuers in smaller capital 
markets continue to use rights offers (Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen 1997).    
 
According to Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen (1997), rights with standby 
underwriting (standby offers) have become the dominant flotation method in the 
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). The firm commitment method, on the other hand, is 
not observed for public offerings on the OSE. They provide evidence on expected 
shareholder subscription as a determinant of the flotation method, a central 
variable in the asymmetric information framework of Eckbo and Masulis (1992). 
They find that the probability that the issuer selects to underwrite a rights offer 
increases significantly as expected shareholder take-up decreases. Moreover, they 
find little evidence of managerial reluctance to issue rights with a deep discount, 
and do not detect any significant evidence that a deep discount signals negative 
information about equity value, as opposed to Heinkel and Schwartz (1986). 
 
Furthermore, Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen (1997) find, contrary to the U.S. 
evidence, that the two-day announcement effect of rights offers is significantly 
positive and greater for uninsured rights than for standbys, and the effect is more 
negative the greater the issue size. They also find the effect more negative the 
greater the pre-announcement run-up in the issuers’ stock price, and more positive 
the greater the proportion of the voting stock held by board members and the CEO 
prior to the issue. These results are consistent with other research in smaller 
capital markets and support the hypothesis that issue markets reflect information 
asymmetries, which again possibly influence the choice of flotation method.  
 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1994) conclude that post-offering performance for 
SEOs is similar to that of IPOs. They find that long-term negative abnormal 
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returns are a general feature found in all common stock offerings. Furthermore, 
they claim that these results are “consistent with managers being able to take 
advantage of firm-specific information to issue equity when the firm’s stock is 
overvalued.”  
 
Research from the U.S., mentioned above, shows a fall in the value of common 
stock on the announcement of SEOs. Thus, announcing a SEO can be interpreted 
as a sign of an overvalued stock, and may cause a negative announcement effect. 
  
Loughran and Ritter (1997) find that issuers continue to invest heavily even while 
their performance deteriorates post-offering. This occurs even in the fourth and 
fifth year of underperformance. They suggest that the managers are just as 
overoptimistic about the issuing firm’s future profitability as are investors.  
 
2.2 Private Placements 
We will now take a look at the most important findings from some of the research 
done on private placements. To begin with, we will take a look at the 
underinvestment problem, which is a basis for later research.  
 
Mayers and Majluf (1984) show that when we have information asymmetry, 
better informed managers issue common stock only when they believe their stock 
is overvalued. Thus the market reacts negatively to an earnings announcement. To 
avoid a wealth transfer from old to new stockholders, they show that the managers 
of undervalued firms with little financial slack will choose to forgo a profitable 
investment opportunity in order to avoid issuing common stock. This is called the 
underinvestment problem.  
 
The two next articles we go through both show positive announcement effects 
when a private placement is announced, but they provide different explanations as 
to what gives this positive effect; ownership concentration and information-
signaling. 
 
Wruck (1989) found that the positive announcement effect of a private placement 
is highly correlated with the resulting change in ownership concentration. 
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Assuming no other changes in share ownership, a private sale puts a block in 
place and dilutes the voting power of existing blocks. On the other hand, a public 
sale simply dilutes the voting power of existing shareholder blocks.  
 
Over half of the private placement purchasers are not previously affiliated with 
the firm they purchase shares in, meaning they have not been managers or 
previous shareholders in the firm. Thus, when a well-informed non-management 
investor buys a security block this is expected to give the market a positive signal, 
whereas a public offering is expected to give a negative signal. 
 
Increased ownership concentration increases firm value if it helps align the 
incentives of the owners and the shareholders. Although, it can also decrease firm 
value if the private sale allows entrenchment. Wruck’s results show that for low 
levels (0% to 5%) and high levels (≥ 25%) of ownership concentration after the 
sale the changes in firm value at announcement are positively associated with the 
change in ownership concentration. However, in the middle range (5% to 25%) 
this relationship is negative.  
 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) provide an information-signaling explanation of the 
value gains associated with private placement announcements. Their model 
extends the model of Myers and Majluf and allows for the possibility that, at some 
cost, private placement investors can correctly estimate the firm’s true value 
through their negotiations with the management. Thus the investor’s willingness 
to commit funds to the firm, in addition to the management’s decision to forgo a 
public issue, will convey a signal to the market that the firm is undervalued.  
 
Having looked at some of the reasons for the positive announcement effect, we 
will now move on to the long-term stock performance of the issuing firm.  
 
Rees et al. 2002 show that public firms that perform private placements 
experience positive announcement effects and negative post announcement stock 
price performance. This finding is inconsistent with the underreaction hypothesis, 
and instead suggests overoptimism about the issuing firm’s prospects. However, 
in contrast to public offerings, private issues tend to follow periods of poor 
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operating performance. Thus, the overoptimism at the time of the issue is not due 
to the behavioral tendency to overweight recent experiences.  
 
Chou, Gombola and Liu (2009) conclude that the post-offering performance of 
private equity issuers is related to growth opportunities. They find significant long 
run underperformance in stock returns following private placements only for firms 
with high Tobin’s q. In addition, these high Tobin’s q firms also have poor 
operating performance. They investigate three potential explanations and find that 
the results are consistent with the view that investors are overly optimistic about 
the prospects of high growth firms.  
 
Having looked at both the previous research on SEOs and Private Placements and 
seeing their traditionally opposite announcement effects and same long-run 
underperforformance, we take a look at one last article which looks at 
characteristics of the issuing firms.  
 
Lee and Kocher (2001) compare the firm characteristics of firms issuing common 
stock through private placements and those using public offering methods. Their 
results show that the private placements are smaller in size, have more growth 
opportunities and thus have a greater degree information asymmetry than public 
offering firms. Additionally, private placement firms have less financial slack than 
public offering firms, giving them a greater need for external capital. Due to all 
this, the firms issuing stocks through private placement are more likely to be 
driven by their needs for external capital, rather than being motivated by an 
overvaluation in their stocks. These findings are consistent with the information 
hypothesis. 
 
3 Research question 
 
Looking at the existing literature on SEOs and Private Placements, we have found 
two main questions we would like to answer with our research:  
 
1. Why do companies chose to undertake a “reparasjonsemisjon”? 
2. What are the announcement effect and the long-run performance of a 
“reparasjonsemisjon”?  
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We would like to take a look at why this type of offering has become more 
common the recent years. What incentives does a company have to go through 
with a “reparasjonsemisjon”? Thus far, we have thought about three possible 
reasons. One reason is based on fairness. Seeing as a private equity issue is mostly 
directly negotiated with a single or a small group of investors, many or maybe all 
the existing shareholders are left out of this issuing. A “reparasjonsemisjon” can 
therefore be a way of pleasing the existing shareholders, by letting them also have 
the opportunity to be included in a possible company value increase. In addition, 
it can prevent dilution of the current stockholders’ shares after the first issuing. 
 
We have already found some data supporting this reason in the prospectus from 
the equity issuance: 
- In the prospectus of Star Reefers (12.03.10) they explain that: “In order to 
treat all shareholders in the Company equally and secure that all 
shareholders are given the possibility of maintaining their relative 
ownership shares in the Company, shareholders that were not offered to 
participate in the Private Placement will be offered to participate in the 
Subsequent Offering” (www.sebenskilda.no). 
- Scandinavian Property Development (23.07.09) had two objectives when 
implementing their subsequent offering: “(i) the shareholders of the 
Company as of 26 June 2009 who were not offered to participate in the 
Private Placement are given the opportunity to, as far as possible, maintain 
their relative shareholding in the Company following the Private 
Placement and the Subsequent Offering, and (ii) the shareholders of the 
Company as of 25 June 2009 who participated in the Private Placement, 
but who had their subscription reduced to a number of Placement Shares 
which was lower than their pro rata share of the Private Placement, are 
given the opportunity to subscribe for and, as far as possible, be allocated a 
number of Offer Shares equal to the number of Placement Shares by which 
their subscription was reduced.” (www.sebenskilda.no) 
- Rocksource (03.06.10): “The main purpose of the Subsequent Offering is 
to enable Shareholders who were not allocated Shares in the Private 
Placement the ability to subscribe for Shares at the same price as in the 
Private Placement and to limit dilution from the Private Placement.” 
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The second possible reason for going through with a “reparasjonsemisjon” could 
be money demand. It may be a kind of “safety net” in case the private placement 
does not provide the needed amount, thus the “reparasjonsemisjon” is a second 
chance of raising enough equity to follow through with a company’s plans. 
However, seeing as the secondary offerings usually contain much less shares for 
sale than the private placement, our first reason may be more plausible.   
 
A third reason for conducting a private placement before the secondary equity 
offering might be that the companies see this as a faster and more “secure" way to 
access the equity needed. However, if it is the speed that is the factor here, why do 
they go through with a secondary offering afterwards? And if getting hold of the 
money fast enough actually is a factor, are the companies that perform a 
“reparasjonsemisjon” in a worse state financially than other firms? 
 
In addition to our first question, it would be interesting to compare the 
announcement effect and the long-run performance of a “reparasjonsemisjon” to  
the effects and long-run performance of the SEOs and Private Placements, as a 
“reparasjonsemisjon can be considered a “hybrid” of the two. Considering the fact 
that the phenomenon is as new as it is, long-run performance may be difficult to 
determine.  
 
Throughout the process of writing the thesis, these two research questions might 
be reconsidered and possibly narrowed down a little.  
 
4 Data 
4.1 Qualitative data 
Regarding our first research question: “Why do firms undertake a 
“reparasjonsemisjon”?” we plan on getting this information through qualitative 
data. We would like to set up interviews with several companies which have 
carried out such a “reparasjonsemisjon” to get an insight as to why they chose this 
form of equity issuing. Another possible source it would be interesting to 
interview would for example be DnB Nor Markets or SEB Enskilda, which have 
facilitated several subsequent offerings. In addition, we have started looking at the 
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firm’s prospectus, where they often supply a reason for the subsequent offering. 
This too can be a useful information source.  
 
4.2 Quantitative data 
The second question will be answered by empirical tests of the gathered data from 
Øyvind Norli. We have data on both private placements and seasoned equity 
offerings, and we have gone through the seasoned equity offerings to identify 
which of these were in fact secondary offerings.  
 
5 Methodology 
 
In addition to setting up interviews with companies issuing equity through 
secondary offerings and the banks who facilitate the sales, we need to perform 
empirical tests to find the financial effects of a “reparasjonsemisjon”. 
 
To find out the announcement effect of the subsequent offering, we need to 
examine the stock-price performance both before and after the sale is announced. 
Before, to get an insight into the circumstances around the time the managers 
chose to issue and after, to reveal whether the changes in shareholder value are 
permanent or transitory. We would like to use our data to check whether we have 
any abnormal performance and will use a standardized test statistic to determine 
whether the mean abnormal return is significantly different from zero. The 
benchmark we will compare the returns with will be both firms which have not 
performed any equity issuing, in addition to companies which have performed a 
regular seasoned equity offering with no private placement on beforehand. 
 
Determining whether we have any abnormal performance as a consequence of 
announcing a subsequent offering will be our starting point. In case we find that 
mean abnormal returns are significantly different from zero, we would find it 
interesting to investigate what determinants that causes the announcement effect. 
For instance, is it well documented that issue size is a determinant that influences 
the announcement effect; the greater the issue, the more negative announcement 
effect. The fact that a subsequent offering usually is of a smaller issue size than a 
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private placement and a regular seasoned equity issue can be an explanatory factor 
in case of a different announcement effect.    
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